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Abstract
Protocol narrations are widely used in security as semi-formal notations to specify con-
versations between roles. We define a translation from a protocol narration to the sequences
of operations to be performed by each role. Unlike previous works, we reduce this compila-
tion process to well-known decision problems in formal protocol analysis. This allows one
to define a natural notion of prudent translation and to reuse many known results from the
literature in order to cover more crypto-primitives. In particular this work is the first one to
show how to compile protocols parameterised by the properties of the available operations.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are designed to prescribe message exchanges between agents in hostile
environment in order to guarantee some security properties such as confidentiality. There are
many apparently similar ways to describe a given security protocol. However one has to be
precise when specifying how a message should be interpreted and processed by an agent since
overlooking subtle details may lead to dramatic flaws. The main issues are the following:
• What parts of a received message should be extracted and checked by an agent?
• What actions should be performed by an agent to compute an answer?
These questions are often either partially or not at all adressed in common protocol descriptions
such as the so-called protocol narrations. A protocol narration is the definition of a cryptographic
protocol by the intended sequence of messages. For example the well-known Needham-Schroeder
Public Key protocol [23] is conveniently specified by the following text:
A→B:enc(〈A,Na〉 ,KB)
B→A:enc(〈Na, Nb〉 ,KA)
A→B:enc(Nb,KB)
where
A knows A,B,KA,KB,K
−1
A
B knows A,B,KA,KB,K
−1
B
Protocol narrations are also a textual representation of Message Sequence Charts (MSC), which
are employed e.g. in RFCs. For more complex protocols, one needs to indicate the internal
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Client Host
U =<username> →
← s =<salt from passwd file>
Upon identifying himself to the host, the client will receive the
salt stored on the host under his username.
a =random()
A = ga%N →
v =<stored password verifier>
b =random()
← B = (v + gb)%N
p =<raw password>
x = SHA(s|SHA(U |” : ”|p))
S = (B − gx)(a+u∗x)%N S = (A ∗ vu)b%N
K =SHA Interleave(S) K =SHA Interleave(S)
Figure 1: Annotated message sequence chart extracted from the RFC 2945 (SRP Authentication
and Key Exchange System)
computations of each participant either by annotating the MSC or by employing the Lowe oper-
ator [17] or otherwise express internal actions that have to be performed, as in the specification
of Fig. 1.
We claim that all internal computations specified in Figure 1, and more generally most such
annotations, can be computed automatically from the protocol narration. Our goal in this paper
is to give an operational semantics to—or, equivalently, to compile—protocol narrations so that
internal actions (excluding e.g. storing a value in a special list for a use external to the protocol)
are described.
Related works Although many works have been dedicated to verifying cryptographic pro-
tocols in various formalisms, only a few have considered the different problems of extracting
operational (non ambiguous) role definitions from protocol descriptions. Operational roles are
expressed as multiset rewrite rules in CAPSL [20], CASRUL [15], or sequential processes of
the spi-calculus with pattern-matching [6]. This extraction is also used for end-point projec-
tion [18, 19]. A pioneering work in this area is one by Carlsen [7] that has proposed a system for
translating protocol narrations into CKT5 [5], a modal logic of communication, knowledge and
time.
Compiling narrations to roles has been extended beyond perfect encryption primitives to
algebraic theories in [10, 22]. We can note that, although these works admit very similar goals,
all their operational role computations are ad-hoc and lack of a uniform principle. In particular
they essentially re-implemented previously known techniques. An advantage of [22] is that it
supports implicit decryption which may lead to more efficient secrecy decision procedures.
We propose here a uniform approach to role computation that allows us to relate the problem
to well-known decision results in formal cryptographic protocols analysis, namely the reachability
problem. Moreover this approach is also used successfully for the automatic computation of
prudent security wrapper (a.k.a. security tests) for filtering messages received by principals.
We show how to reduce this computation to known results about the standard notion of static
equivalence.
2
2 Role-based Protocol Specifications
First we show how from Alice& Bob notation we can derive a plain role-based specification. Then
the specification will be refined in the following Sections.
2.1 Specification of messages and basic operations
Terms We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variables X . For
each signature F (i.e. a set of function symbols with arities), we denote by T(F) (resp. T(F ,X ))
the set of terms over F ∪C (resp. F ∪C ∪X ). The former is called the set of ground terms over
F , while the later is simply called the set of terms over F . Variables are denoted by x, y, terms
are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of terms are written E,F, ..., and decorations thereof,
respectively. We abbreviate E ∪ F by E,F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E \ {t} by E \ t.
In a signature F a constant is either a free constant or a function symbol of arity 0 in F .
Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of variables occurring in t and by Cons(t) the set of
constants occurring in t. A substitution σ is an idempotent mapping from X to T(F ,X ) such
that Supp(σ) = {x |σ(x) 6= x}, the support of σ, is a finite set. The application of a substitution
σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp.
E) where all variables x have been replaced by the term xσ. A substitution σ is ground if for
each x ∈ Supp(σ) we have xσ ∈ T(F).
Operations. Terms are manipulated by applying operations on them. These operations
are defined by a subset of the signature F called the set of public constructors. A context
C[x1, . . . , xn] is a term in which all symbols are public and such that its nullary symbols are
either public non-free constants or variables.
Equational theories. An equational presentation E = (F , E) is defined by a set E of equations
u = v with u, v ∈ T(F ,X ). The equational theory generated by (F , E) on T(F ,X ) is the smallest
congruence containing all instances of axioms of E (free constants can also be used for building
instances). We write s =E t as the congruence relation between two terms s and t. By abuse of
terminology we also call E the equational theory generated by the presentation E when there is
no ambiguity. This equational theory is introduced in order to specify the effects of operations
on the messages and the properties of messages.
Deduction systems. A deduction system is defined by a triple (E ,F ,Fp) where E
is an equational presentation on a signature F and Fp a subset of public construc-
tors in F . For instance the following deduction system models public key cryptography:
(
{
dec(enc(x, y), y−1) = x
}
,
{
dec( , ), enc( , ), −1
}
, {dec( , ), enc( , )}) The equational theory
is reduced here to a single equation that expresses that one can decrypt a ciphertext when
the inverse key is available.
2.2 Role Specification
We present in this subsection how protocol narrations are transformed into sets of roles. A role
can be viewed as the projection of the protocol on a principal. The core of a role is a strand
which is a standard notion in cryptographic protocol modeling [14].
A strand is a finite sequence of messages each with label (or polarity) ! or ?. Messages with
label ! (resp. ?) are said to be “sent” (resp.“received”). A strand is positive iff all its labels are !.
Given a list of message l = m1, . . . ,mn we write ?l (resp. !l) as a short-hand for ?m1, . . . , ?mn,
(resp. !m1, . . . , !mn).
Definition 1 A role specification is an expression A(~l) : ν~n.(S) where A is a name, ~l is a
sequence of constants (called the role parameters), ~n is a sequence of constants (called the nonces
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of the role), and S is a strand. Given a role r we denote by nonces(r) the nonces ~n of r and
strand(r) the strand S of r.
Example 1 For example, the initiator of the NSPK protocol is modeled, at this point, with the
role:
νNa.(?Na, ?A, ?B, ?KA, ?KB, ?K
−1
A ,
!msg(B, enc(〈A,Na〉 ,KB)), ?msg(B, enc(〈Na, Nb〉 ,KA)),
!msg(B, enc(Nb,KB)))
with the equational theory of public key cryptography, plus the equations
{π1(〈x, y〉) = x, π2(〈x, y〉) = y}.
Note that nothing guarantees in general that a protocol defined as a set of roles is executable.
For instance some analysis is necessary to see whether a role can derive the required inverse
keys for examining the content of a received ciphertext. We also stress that role specfications do
not contain any variables. The symbols Na, A, . . . in the above example are constants, and the
messages occurring in the role specification are all ground terms.
Plain roles extracted from a narration From a protocol narration where each nonce orig-
inates uniquely we can extract almost directly a set of roles, called plain roles as follows. The
constants occurring in the initial knowledge of a role are the parameters of the strand describing
this role. We model this initial knowledge by a sequence of receptions (from an unspecified agent)
of each term in the initial knowledge. In order to encode narrations we assume that we have
in the signature three public function symbols msg( , ), partner( ) and payload( ) satisfying the
equational theory: {
partner(msg(x, y)) = x
payload(msg(x, y)) = y
For every agent name A in the protocol narration, a role specification for A is A(l) :
νnonces(S).(?nonces(S), ?K,SA), where K is such that A knows K occurs in the protocol nar-
ration, l is the set of constants in K. nonces(S) and strand SA are computed as follows:
Computation of SA: Init SA0 = ∅
On the (n+ 1)-th line S → R :M do
SAn+1 =


Sn, !msg(R,M) If A = S
Sn, ?msg(S,M) If A = R
SAn Otherwise
Computation of nonces(A): This set contains each constant N that appears in the strand
?K,SA inside a message labelled ! and such that N does not occur in previous messages
(with any polarity).
This computation always extracts role specifications from a given protocol narration and it
has the property that every constant appears in a received message before appearing in a sent
message. Since a nonce is to be created within an instance of a role, we reject protocol narrations
from which the algorithm described above extracts two different roles A and B with nonces(A)∩
nonces(B) 6= ∅.
Example 1 is a plain role that can be derived by applying the algorithm to the NSPK protocol
narration. We now define the input of a role specification which informally is the sequence of
messages sent to a role as defined by the protocol narration.
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Definition 2 Let r = νN.( !?Mi)1≤i≤n be a role specification, and let (R1, . . . , Rk) be the subse-
quence of the messages Mi labeled with ?. The input of r is denoted input(r) and is the positive
strand (!R1, . . . , !Rk).
In the next section we define a target for the compilation of role specifications. Then we
compute constraints to be satisfied by sent and received messages. and by adding the constraints
to the specification this one gets executable in the safest way as possible w.r.t. to its initial
specification.
3 Operational semantics for roles
In Section 2 we have defined roles and shown how they can be extracted from protocol narrations.
In this section we define what an implementation of a role is and in Section 4 we will show how
to compute such an implementation from a protocol narration.
Unification systems Intuitively an operational model for a role has to reflect the possible
manipulations on messages performed by a program implementing the role. These operations
are specified here by a deduction system D = (E ,F ,S) where the set of public functions S, a
subset of the signature F , is defined by equations in E . Beside defining function computations,
the equations E specify some properties.
Definition 3 Let E be an equational theory. An E-Unification system S is a finite set of equa-
tions denoted by (ui
?
= vi)i∈{1,...,n} with terms ui, vi ∈ T(F ,X ). It is satisfied by a substitution
σ, and we note σ |= S, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} uiσ =E viσ.
Active frames We introduce now the set of implementations of a role specification as active
frames. An active frame extends the role notion by specifying how a message to be sent is
constructed from already known messages, and how a received message is checked to ascertain
its conformity w.r.t. already known messages. The notation !vi (resp. ?vi) refers to a message
stored in variable vi which is sent (resp. received).
Definition 4 Given a deduction system D with equational theory E, a D-active frame is a se-
quence (Ti)1≤i≤k where
Ti =


!vi with vi
?
= Ci[v1, . . . , vi−1] (send)
or
?vi with Si(v1, . . . , vi) (receive)
where Ci[v1, . . . , vi−1] denotes a context over variables v1, . . . , vi−1 and Si(v1, . . . , vi) denotes a
E-unification system over variables v1, . . . , vi. Each variable vi occuring with polarity ? is an
input variable of the active frame.
Example 2 The following is an active frame denoted φa that can be employed to model the role
A in the NSPK protocol:
(?vNa?vA, ?vB , ?vKA , ?vKB , ?vK−1
A
,
!vmsg1 with vmsg1
?
= msg(vB , enc(〈vA, vNa〉 , vKB )),
?vr with ∅
!vmsg2 with vmsg2
?
= msg(vB , enc(π2(dec(vr , vK−1
A
)), vKB )))
5
Compilation is the computation of an active frame from a role specification such that, when
receiving messages as intended by the role specification, the active frame emits responses equal
modulo the equational theory to the responses issued in the role specification. More formally,
we have the following:
Definition 5 Let D be a deduction system with equational theory E. Let ϕ = (Ti)1≤i≤k be an
active frame, where the Ti’s are as in Definition 4, and where the input variables are r1, . . . , rn.
Let s be a positive strand !M1, . . . , !Mn. Let σϕ,s be the substitution {ri 7→Mi} and S be the
union of the E-unification systems in ϕ. The evaluation of ϕ on s is denoted ϕ · s and is the
strand (m1, . . . ,mk) where:
mi =
{
!Ci[m1, . . . ,mi−1] If vi has label ! in Ti
?viσϕ,s If vi has label ? in Ti
We say that ϕ accepts s if Sσϕ,s is satisfiable.
To simplify notations, the application of a D-context C[x1, . . . , xn] on a positive strand s =
(!t1, . . . , !tn) of length n is denoted C · s and is the term C[t1, . . . , tn].
Example 3 Let r be the role specification of role A in NSPK as given in Ex. 1 and φA be the
active frame of Ex. 2. We have:
input(r) = (!Na, !A, !B, !KA, !KB, !K
−1
A , !msg(B, enc(〈Na, Nb〉 ,KA)))
and φA · input(r) is the strand:
(?Na, ?A, ?B, ?KA, ?KB, ?K
−1
A , !msg(B, enc(〈A,Na〉 ,KB)), ?msg(B, enc(〈Na, Nb〉 ,KA)),
!msg(B, enc(π2(dec(payload(msg(B, enc(〈Na, Nb〉 ,KA))),K
−1
A )),KB))
Modulo the equational theory, this strand is equal to the strand:
(?Na, ?A, ?B, ?KA, ?KB, ?K
−1
A , !msg(B, enc(〈A,Na〉 ,KB)), ?msg(B, enc(〈Na, Nb〉 ,KA)),
!msg(B, enc(Nb,KB))
It is not coincidental that in Ex. 3 the strands ϕ · input(r) and strand(r) are equal as it means
that within the active frame, the sent messages are composed from received ones in such a way
that when receiving the messages expected in the protocol narration, the role responds with the
messages intended by the protocol narration. This fact gives us a criterion to define functional
implementations of a role.
Definition 6 An active frame ϕ is an implementation of a role specification r if ϕ accepts
input(r) and ϕ · input(r) =E strand(r). If a role admits an implementation we say this role is
executable.
Example φa defined above is a possible implementation of the initiator role in NSPK. However
this implementation does not check the conformity of the messages with the intended patterns,
e.g. it neither checks that vr is really an encryption with the public key vKA of a pair, nor that
the first argument of the encrypted pair has the same value as the nonce vNa . In Section 4 we
show not only how to compute an active frame when the role specification is executable, but also
to ensure that all the possible checks are performed.
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4 Compilation of role specifications
Usually the compilation of a specification is defined by a compilation algorithm. An originality
of this work is that we present the result of the compilation as the solution to decision problems.
This has the advantage of providing for free a notion of prudent implementation as explained
below.
4.1 Computation of a “vanilla” implementation
Let us first present how to compute an implementation of a role specification in which no check
is performed, as given in the preceding example. To build such an implementation we need
to compute for every sent message m a context Cm that evaluates to m when applied to the
previously received ones. This reachability problem is unsolvable in general. Hence we have to
consider systems that admit a reachability algorithm, formally defined below:
Definition 7 Given a deduction system D with equational theory E, a D-reachability algorithm
AD computes, given a positive strand s of length n and a term t, a D-context AD(s, t) =
C[x1, . . . , xn] such that C · s =E t iff there exists such a context and ⊥ otherwise.
We will show that several interesting theories admit a reachability algorithm. This algorithm
can be employed as an oracle to compute the contexts in sent messages and therefore to derive
an implementation of a role specification r. We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If there exists a D-reachability algorithm then it can be decided whether a role
specifications r is executable and, if so one can compute an implementation of r.
Proof sketch. Let r = ( !?Mi)i∈{1,...,n} be an executable role specification. By definition there
exists an active frame ϕ that implements r, i.e. for each sent message Mi, there exists a context
Ci such that Ci[M1, . . . ,Mi−1] is equal to Mi modulo the equational theory. Thus if there exists
a D-reachability algorithm AD, the result AD(M1, . . . ,Mi−1),Mi) cannot be ⊥ by definition. As
a consequence, AD((M1, . . . ,Mi−1),Mi) is a context C
′
i[x1, . . . , xn]. Thus for all index i such
that Mi is sent we can compute a context C
′
i that, when applied on previous messages, yields
the message to send. We thus have an implementation of the role specification.
4.2 Computation of a prudent implementation
Computing an active frame is not enough since one would want to model that received messages
are checked as thoroughly as possible. For instance in Example 1, a prudent implementation of
the message reception “?vr with ∅” should be:
?vr with π1(dec(payload(vr), vK−1
A
))
?
= vNa ∧ partner(vr)
?
= vB
Let us first formalize this by a refinement relation on sequences of messages. We will say a strand
s refines a strand s′ if any observable equality of subterms in strand s can be observed in s′ using
the same tests. To put it formally:
Definition 8 A positive strand s = (!M1, . . . , !Mn) refines a positive strand s
′ = (!M ′1, . . . , !M
′
n)
if, for any pair of contexts (C1[x1, . . . , xn], C2[x1, . . . , xn]) one has C1 · s′ = C2 · s′ implies
C1 · s = C2 · s.
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For instance the strand s = (!enc(enc(a, k′), k), !enc(a, k′), !k, !k′, !a) refines s′ =
(!enc(enc(a, k′), k), !enc(a, k′), !k, !k′′, !a) since all equalities that can be checked on s′ can be
checked on s. We can now define an implementation to be prudent if every equality satisfied by
the sequence of messages of the protocol specification is satisfied by any accepted sequence of
messages.
Definition 9 Let r be a role specification and ϕ be an implementation of r. We say that ϕ is
prudent if any positive strand s accepted by ϕ is a refinement of input(r).
As we shall see in Section 5, most deduction systems considered in the context of cryptographic
protocols analysis have the property that it is possible to compute, given a positive strand, a finite
set of context pairs that summarizes all possible equalities in the sense of the next definition.
Let us first introduce a notation: Given a positive strand s we let Ps be the set of context pairs
(C1, C2) such that C1 · s = C2 · s.
Definition 10 A deduction system D has the finite basis property if for each positive strand s
one can compute a finite set P fs of pairs of D-contexts such that, for each positive strand s
′:
Ps ⊆ Ps′ iff P
f
s ⊆ Ps′
Let us now assume that a deduction system D has the finite basis property. There thus exists
an algorithm A′D(s) that takes a positive strand s as input, computes a finite set P
f
s of con-
text pairs (C[x1, . . . , xn], C
′[x1, . . . , xn]) and returns as a result the E-unification system Ss :{
C[x1, . . . , xn]
?
= C′[x1, . . . , xn] | (C,C
′) ∈ P fs
}
. For any positive strand s′ = (!m1, . . . , !mn) of
length n, let σs′ be the substitution {xi 7→ mi}1≤i≤n. By definition of Ss we have that σs′ |= Ss
if and only if s′ is a refinement of s. Given the preceding definition of AD(s, t), we are now ready
to present our algorithm for the compilation of role specifications into active frames.
Algorithm Let r be a role specification with strand(r) = ( !?M1, . . . ,
!
?Mn) and let s =
(!M1, . . . , !Mn). Let us introduce two notations to simplify the writing of the algorithm, i.e. we
write r(i) to denote the i-th labelled message !?Mi in r, and s
i to denote the prefix (!M1, . . . , !Mi)
of s. Compute, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
Ti =
{
!vi with vi
?
= AD(si−1,Mi) If r(i) =!Mi
?vi with A
′
D(s
i) If r(i) =?Mi
and return the active frame ϕr = (Ti)1≤i≤n. By construction we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let D be a deduction system such that D-ground reachability is decidable and D has
the finite basis property. Then for any executable role specification r one can compute a prudent
implementation ϕ.
5 Examples and Applications
Many theories that are relevant to cryptographic protocol design satisfy the hypothesis of The-
orem 2. For instance let us introduce the convergent subterm theory:
Definition 11 An equational theory is convergent subterm if it admits a presentation by a set
of equations E =
⋃n
i=1 {li = ri} such that E is a convergent set of rules such that each ri is either
a proper subterm of li or a ground term.
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It is known (see e.g. [2]) that reachability is decidable for subterm convergent theories. It
was proved in [1] that any subterm convergent theory has the finite basis property too. This is
a consequence of Proposition 11 in [1] that is used by the authors to decide the so-called static
equivalence property for this class of theories. We give more details in the Appendix.
Many interesting theories are subterm convergent. For instance consider the Dolev-Yao equa-
tional theory:
EDY


π1(〈x, y〉) = x (P1)
π2(〈x, y〉) = y (P2)
dec(enc(x, y), y−1) = x (D)
symtest(enc(x, y), y) = true (Te)
pairtest(〈x, y〉) = true (Tp)
where (P1) (resp. (P2)) models the projections on the arguments of a pair, (D) models the
decryption using the inverse key and (Te) (resp. (Tp)) models that anyone knowing a public
key can test whether a message is encrypted with this key (resp. that anyone can test whether
a message is a pair.) As a consequence of our Theorem 2, for every protocol expressed with
functions satisfying this theory we can compute a prudent implementation.
The equational theory of the eXclusive-OR operator · ⊕ · is given by the following set of
equations E⊕ where 0 is a constant and ⊕, 0 are public functions:
E⊕


(x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
0⊕ x = x
x⊕ x = 0
This example can be generalized to monoidal theories as follows. Assume that all symbols
are public and that the signature of a deduction system is equal to F ={+, 0, h1, . . . , hn} or
{+,−, 0, h1, . . . , hn} where + is a binary associative-commutative symbol, 0 is the identity for
+, the symbol − is unary and satisfies the equation x + (−x) = 0 and h1, . . . , hn (for n ≥ 0)
are unary commuting homomorphism on + (i.e. such that hi(x + y) = hi(x) + hi(y) and
hi(hj(x)) = hj(hi(x)) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n). Let us add to the signature a1, . . . , ak the constants
appearing in the protocol narration.
Reachability for this resulting deduction system is decidable (see e.g. [11, 12]). We can also
show that the deduction system has the finite basis property: Each ground term in the narration
can be interpreted as an element of the module (Z[X1, . . . , Xn])
k as follows:
• [[ai]] is the vector in which only the i-th coordinate is non-null, and is equal to 1;
• [[hi(t)]] = Xi · [[t]], and [[t1 + t2]] = [[t1]] + [[t2]], and [[− t]] = −[[t]].
It is routine to check that under these assumptions, we have that:
1. A context with m holes is interpreted as a linear form mapping ((Z[X1, . . . , Xn])
k)m to
(Z[X1, . . . , Xn])
k and with coefficients in Z[X1, . . . , Xn]. These polynomials have positive
coefficients whenever − is not a public symbol;
2. In any case we note that any linear form with coefficients in Z[X1, . . . , Xn] can be written
as the difference of two linear forms with positive coefficients.
Under this interpretation for a positive strand s of length n interpreted as a vector in
(Z[X1, . . . , Xn]
k)n and a pair of contexts C1, C2 we have [[C1 ·s = C2 ·s]] iff ([[C1]]−[[C2]])([[s]]) = 0,
i.e. there is a mapping from Ps to the set s
∗ of linear forms f such that f([[s]]) = 0. The second
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remark above shows that this mapping is surjective. Since s∗ is the first syzygy module [21] of a
linear equation, s∗ is also isomorphic to a submodule of (Z[X1, . . . , Xn]
k)n. Since Z[X1, . . . , Xn]
is noetherian this syzygy submodule has a finite generating set b1, . . . , bl that can be computed
by an analogous of Buchberger’s algorithm [21].
Given another strand s′ of the same length, if {b1, . . . , bl} ⊆ (s′)∗ we have also s∗ ⊆ (s′)∗.
In other words we have that s′ refines s. We thus obtain an algorithm to compute P fs for any
strand s that consists in computing a generating set b1, . . . , bl of s
∗, write each bi as the difference
b+i − b
−
i of two linear forms with positive coefficients, and output a set of n pairs of contexts
(C+i , C
−
i ) with [[C
+
i ]] = b
+
i and [[C
−
i ]] = b
−
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how to link the process of compiling protocols to excutable roles with formal
decision problems. This allows us to extend many known results on compilation to the case of
protocols that are based on more complex cryptographic primitives, admitting algebraic proper-
ties that are beyond the usual Dolev Yao ones.
Moreover if the set of symbols occuring in the protocol can be divided so that each part
satisfies an equational theory with decidable D-reachability and D has the finite basis property,
then we can exploit the combination results from [9, 3] to derive the same properties for the
union of theories. Therefore the protocol can be prudently compiled in this case too.
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Appendix
This Appendix has been added to ease the review. We recall some notions and results from [1]
and explain why they show that any subterm convergent theory has the finite basis property.
Let E be a subterm convergent theory. The constant cE introduced in [1] depends only from
the equational theory E but its exact value is not important for our discussion. The size of a
11
term t is the number of vertices in its DAG representation. It is denoted by |t|. To any positive
strand s = (!M1, . . . , !Mn) we can associate a frame with an empty set of free names in the sense
of [1]. This frame is {M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn} and will be denoted s too (assuming some variable
enumeration). We will reformulate or simplify the results from [1] by taking into account the
fact that there are no nonces in the frames in our case. Note that s can also be viewed as a
substitution.
Let st(s) be the set of subterms of s. The set sat(s) (see Definition 3 [1]) is the minimal set
such that
1. M1, . . . ,Mn ∈ sat(s);
2. if N1, . . . , Nk ∈ sat(s) and f(N1, . . . , Nk) is a subterm of s then f(N1, . . . , Nk) ∈ sat(s);
3. if N1, . . . , Nk ∈ sat(s) and C[N1, . . . , Nk] → M where C is a context, |C| ≤ cE and M in
st(s) then M ∈ sat(s),
Also Proposition 9 from [1] shows that for everyM ∈ sat(s) there exists a term ζM such that
|ζM |DAG ≤ cE · |s| and ζM · s =E M .
We can now restate Definition 4 from [1] in our framework:
Definition 4 The set Eq(s) is the set of couples:
(C1[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ], C2[ζM ′1 , . . . , ζM ′l ])
such that (C1[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] =E C2[ζM ′1 , . . . , ζM ′l ]) · s, |C1|, |C2| ≤ cE and the terms Mi,M
′
i are
in sat(s).
Since there are no nonces the set Eq(s) is finite (up to variable renamings).
We recall Lemma 6 and 7 from [1] with our notations:
Lemma 8 Let s, s′ be two positive strands such that Eq(s) ⊆ P ′s. Then for all contexts C1, C2
and for all terms Mi,M
′
i ∈ sat(s) if C1[M1, . . . ,Mk] = C2[M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
l ] then C1[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] ·
s′ =E C2[ζM ′
1
, . . . , ζM ′
l
] · s′.
Lemma 9 Let s be a positive strand. For every context C1, for every Mi ∈ sat(s) for every term
T such that C1[M1, . . . ,Mk] →∗E T there is a context C2 and terms M
′
i ∈ sat(s) such that T =
C2[M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
l ] and for every positive strand s
′ such that Eq(s) ⊆ P ′s we have C1[ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] ·
s′ =E C2[ζM ′
1
, . . . , ζM ′
l
] · s′.
Now we can now extract from Proposition 11 in [1] the part of the proof that shows our
claim:
Assume that s, s′ are two positive strands and Eq(s) ⊆ P ′s. Assume that we have an equality:
M · s =E N · s. Let T be the common normal form of M · s and N · s for the rewrite relation
→E .
By Lemma 7 there exists Mi ∈ sat(s) and CM such that
T = CM [M1, . . . ,Mk] and M · s
′ =E CM [ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] · s
′.
By the same lemma there exists M ′i ∈ sat(s) and CN such that
T = CN [M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
l ] and N · s
′ =E CN [ζM ′
1
, . . . , ζM ′
l
] · s′.
Since CM [M1, . . . ,Mk] = CN [M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
l ] we derive from Lemma 6 that:
CM [ζM1 , . . . , ζMk ] · s
′ =E CN [ζM ′
1
, . . . , ζM ′
l
] · s′
As a consequence we have M · s′ = N · s′. We can conclude that Ps ⊆ P
′
s. and that the
deduction system has the finite basis property by defining for all s, P fs to be Eq(s).
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